How knowledge transfer and absorption impact on the profitability of foreign affiliates in Transition Economy? The case of Poland: 1993-2002 by Pawlik, Konrad
 
WORKING PAPER 2005-05 
Konrad Pawlik 
How knowledge transfer and absorptive capacity impact the 
profitability of foreign affiliates in Transition Economy? The 
case of Poland: 1993-2002 
International Business Section 
 How knowledge transfer and absorptive capacity impact on the 
profitability of foreign affiliates in Transition Economy? 




Konrad Pawlik  
Department of Management and International Business 
 Aarhus School of Business 
 Haslegaardsvej 10-12 
Aarhus, Denmark 
Phone: +45 8948 6862 






Using a unique database on industry variables (wages, employment, foreign capital share, investments, 
sales, etc.) of foreign-owned companies in Poland covering the years 1993-2002, this paper analyses the 
determinants of the performance of foreign affiliates. Based on industry external (GDP) and internal factors 
(number of foreign affiliates), the statistical analysis has been divided into three time spans: “uncertainty”, 
“expansion”, and “maturity”. The results show the association between foreign control and profitability to 
change over time: in the expansion stage, the association is positive while, in the uncertain and mature 
stages, it is negative. Labour compensation, which is seen as an indicator for the absorptive capacity, tends 
to be positively associated with profitability in the uncertainty stage. High investment activity is associated 
with a high level of profitability only during maturity: in the other stages, there is no evidence of any 
relationship. Consequently, the paper illustrates the stepwise approach to efficient behaviour characteristic 
of foreign companies operating in a transition economy. The managerial implications of the findings are 
clear: at first foreign affiliates improve their absorptive capacity (labour compensation), then they transfer 
distinct tacit knowledge (increasing foreign control) and, eventually, they transfer production technology 
embodied in production equipment (increasing investment outlays relative to sales). 
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1 An earlier version of this paper was presented as competitive at the Academy of International Business Annual 
Conference in Quebec City, Canada 2005.   2
1. Introduction 
Although there is a vast literature on Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), our knowledge of many of its aspects 
is still rudimentary. Numerous studies have addressed the question of why companies choose to operate in 
foreign markets by undertaking foreign direct investments, but the number of studies addressing the issue of 
the performance of foreign affiliates is still insufficient. This statement is especially valid in the case of 
transition economies, where foreign companies are new entrants and the profitability of their affiliates may 
be determined by various strategy and environmental aspects. The aim of this study is to identify patterns or 
links between foreign-affiliate profits and determinants such as knowledge absorption, transfer and 
complexity.  
The literature on the determinants of performance (profitability) in foreign affiliates is vast (Gomes-Casseres 
2003). Several studies have analysed various parameters which influence the profits of foreign affiliates: 
among them, firm market share, advertising, R&D intensity, sales growth, and the multinationality of MNEs 
(Lecraw, 1984). In some studies, estimations of the profit determinants have been conducted separately for 
joint ventures and wholly owned affiliates, showing differences across ownership types (Nakamura, 1991). 
The study by Sim and Ali (1998) on the profitability of international joint ventures focused on the parent 
firm’s characteristics (its firm size, multinationality, experience, horizontal and vertical linkage, etc.) as the 
principal explanatory source of growing profits. A relatively large group of analyses (for instance, Fairhild 
and Sosin 1986; Kumar 1991 and 1994) compares the profitability of foreign affiliates with that of their 
domestic counterparts, finding several determinants for performance. Fairhild and Sosin (1986) estimated the 
differences in technological activity between foreign and domestic companies in Latin America. After 
controlling for scale, age and location of the firm, they found differences in either traditional methods of 
growth or profitability or in the implementation of new technology embodied in the processes and products.   
As regards the profitability of firms in transition countries, the studies undertaken have to a large extent 
focused on the relation to privatisation methods and their efficiency, i.e., on the performance of post-
privatised companies (Bevan et al., 1999). As a result, other types of determinants of foreign affiliate 
profitability remain underresearched. This is surprising as the primary reason for transition economies to   3
attempt to increase the volume of foreign investment has been the desire to acquire modern technology and 
organizational knowledge leading to significant upgrading of the companies formed under the central 
planning regime. The reason for specifically favouring multinational enterprises (MNEs) was their 
possession of a set of advantages (over domestic enterprises): substantial financial resources, advanced 
technology, superior products, powerful brands, and management experience (Dawar and Frost, 1999). In 
relation to performance, aspects of knowledge transfer are, consequently, assumed to be the major factor in 
newly restructured or established companies in transition countries. 
Such knowledge absorption and transfer and the complexity of these within MNEs have been the subject of 
much research (Kogut and Zander, 1995; Cantwell, 1991; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), but there is still some 
scope for analysis of the occurrence of these phenomena in transition economies. Research in this field has 
primarily been based on the analysis of case studies (Newman and Nollen, 1998, Kogut, 1996, Brada 2003) 
or firm level data (Meyer, 2002, Minbaeva, 2004), all of which are static observations often based on 
subjective answers (questionnaires). The main findings have been that entry into new markets, establishing 
marketing, new brand names and distribution channels are the primary changes which foreign investors bring 
to transition countries (Newman and Nollen, 1998). According to case studies, the successful firms in 
transition countries were those which received a large amount of managerial knowledge, which in principle 
is tacit in its form (Kogut, 1996; Meyer, 2002; Brada, 2003), while large investments in capital and 
technology were less important features in the first phase of the successful restructuring of recently acquired 
companies (Meyer, 2002). The issue of absorptive capacity is an interesting research aspect in the case of 
transition economies because the firms had to improve their fundamental capabilities, allowing the transfer 
of knowledge and adaptation to such knowledge in the receiving unit (Tihanyi and Roath, 2002).  
In Poland, the process of the systemic transition from a command to a market economy began more than a 
decade ago and, over that time, foreign capital has contributed to the amount of stock Foreign Direct 
Investments of 65 billion USD (PAIZ, 2002). This large inflow of FDI has rendered foreign affiliates 
increasingly important in several industries (Pawlik, 2005). The effects of the “behaviour” of a firm are often 
estimated in terms of its performance, as profitability and comparison of the financial standing of foreign   4
affiliates to domestic companies illustrate some flux over time in the profitability as evidenced in, for 
example, such measures as return on equity (Figure 1) and sales (Figure 2).  










1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Domestic private companies Domestic public companies Foreign Affiliates
 
Source: Own calculation based on a database received from GUS.  
Note: Annual return on equity has been calculated from aggregated measures of equity and profits/loss for three types 
of companies: foreign affiliates, domestic private and domestic public companies. 
Having increased their profitability in the first few years after 1993, foreign affiliates record steady drops 
from 1996-1999 while years 2000-2002 show some fluctuations in the profitability measured on equity or 
sales. 
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Source: Own calculation. 
Note: Annual return on sales has been calculated from aggregated measures of equity and profits/loss for three 
types of companies: foreign affiliates, domestic private and domestic public companies.  
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Compared to companies in the two other categories, domestic private companies seem to have smoother 
changes in their results: growth of profitability in the first years of the period analysed and then a drop from 
1996 until the end of the period. Domestic public companies, which, being in the process of privatization and 
restructuring, constitute the most inefficient group of companies, show high volatility in profits with a 
decreasing tendency almost from the beginning of the period analysed. This data clearly shows that a flow-
based measurement such as that of profitability in transition economies fluctuates a great deal and is difficult 
to rely on for the purpose of analysing phenomena over long time spans. However, MNEs clearly need to 
pay attention to environmental forces, if venturing into transition economies. McCarthy, Puffer, and 
Simmonds (1993) found that MNEs often seem to be on a “roller-coaster” in these economies. Figure 3 
illustrates growths of: GDP (environment) and number of foreign affiliates (strategy) where three stages of  
the foreign affiliate’s behaviour in Poland have been identified. 
Figure 3. Growth in the number of foreign affiliates (left scale) and Gross Domestic Product (right 
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Source: Own calculation. 
In 1993-1995, the number of companies and GDP increased substantially, while 1996-1999 was 
characterized by moderate growth in GDP and the number of newly registered foreign affiliates. The years 
2000-2002 showed minimal growth or even some decline in GDP and the number of foreign affiliates. These 
three stages of change in the economic environment and MNE entry behaviour are in line with other studies 
on transition countries which consider the evolutionary path of MNE entry and operation (Peng, 2000). The   6
acquisition of experience represents a major rationale for early expansion in these countries (Luo, 1999, Pan, 
1996). During the early expansion period, many foreign entities were established but their capital 
involvement was still relatively low. In the case of Poland, this behaviour among foreign affiliates is 
observed for the period covering 1993-1995, that is, during the first stage, which may be labelled one of 
“uncertainty”. After some short-term reorganization and the gaining of experience, affiliates reach a stage at 
which they reap an increasing amount of benefits from pre-emptive opportunities (Luo and Peng, 1998). At 
this point, many MNEs are still entering the transition economies and those which are already present are 
likely to subject their companies to deeper restructuring and reorganization. This behaviour may be observed 
in the case of the Polish economy in the years 1996-1999; for present purposes, it will be labelled the stage 
of “expansion”. Later, however, the importance of the performance implications of having a competitive 
edge in terms of experience may decrease as many other MNEs also gain experience. Therefore, the 
contribution of the intensity of experience and the breadth of markets to firm growth may decrease over time 
as local markets gradually mature (Peng and Health, 1996). In Poland, the third stage – that of “maturity” – 
occurs over the years 2000-2002. 
This paper, which is based on unique industry level datasets for foreign affiliates in Poland (1993-2002), 
aims to address challenging questions related to the profitability of foreign affiliates in a transition economy. 
The main objective is to investigate how the performance of the affiliate (i.e., profitability) is determined by 
organizational capabilities such as mechanisms of knowledge absorption and transfer and the complexity of 
these, thus this paper favours the knowledge-based view of the firm (Kogut and Zander 1992, 1993, 1995, 
2003) as well as research on absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) and the specificity of 
knowledge internalization in a transition economy (Meyer, 1998, 2001; Brada, 2003; Newman and Nollen 
1998). The paper tries to identify the direction of and interplay between profitability and labour 
compensation (absorptive capacity), investment intensity (the transfer of complex technology embodied in 
machines and production equipment), and foreign control (the transfer of tacit knowledge), while controlling 
for firm size, export intensity and foreign competition. These parameters will be tested relative to the 
different stages of behaviour and economic performance of foreign affiliates in Poland (“uncertainty”,   7
“expansion” and “maturity”). No other studies on transition economies have approached the issue of 
profitability in this way. Economic transition complicates any research and poses a serious challenge to any 
analysis of what accelerates profits in foreign affiliates. Consequently, studies of this type currently 
constitute precursory research in this field and may bring considerable contributions to the fields of both 
International Business and Transition Economics. 
Section 2 discusses the theoretical underpinnings of the research undertaken in this paper and formulates a 
number of research hypotheses. Section 3 presents the research methodology applied and the variables 
examined. Section 4 gives the results reached and interprets them; and, finally, section 5 draws a number of 
conclusions.  
2. Theory and hypothesis 
2.1. Knowledge transfer 
Foreign direct investment has often been conceptualized as the response of a firm to competitive advantages. 
Firms which possess advantages invest abroad (Caves 1971). The MNE goes abroad to reap profits from its 
store of knowledge, and the creation and exploitation of that knowledge is the main reason for the success 
and growth of the multinational enterprise over time (Dunning, 1988). Given this focus on knowledge, three 
perspectives describing how knowledge determines the expansion tendencies of firms have to be discussed 
and linked to the profitability of foreign affiliates. These perspectives involve (a) public goods; (b) 
internalization; and (c) technological competence (Eden et al, 1997).  
The public good perspective underlines firm specific advantages (FSA) (ownership advantages) coming from 
the possession of intangible assets such as knowledge. The publicness of knowledge suggests that knowledge 
is easy to transfer (Johnson, 1970) but hard to protect. Given the ease of transfer, a critical concern for the 
MNE is the potential for unintended transfer to, and expropriation of that knowledge by, competitors. 
Consequently, the public goods perspective suggests that MNEs will internalize transactions when 
transacting in the external market poses a significant risk of knowledge appropriation by competitors that 
would dissipate the MNE’s knowledge-based FSA (Lorraine at el 1997).    8
The  internalization perspective focuses on aspects that affect the international exchange og knowledge 
knowledge (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Teece 1986; Hennart, 1991). In this view, “it is not the possession of 
knowledge as such which gives the firm its advantage. Rather it is the process of internalizing that asset as 
opposed to selling it to the foreign producer which gives the MNE its unique advantage” (Hood and Young, 
1979). As a result MNEs (and their affiliates) monitor how their firm specific assets are transferred (Buckley 
and Casson, 1976 Rugman, 1981) and internalization decisions rests on the relative weights of bureaucratic 
and transaction costs. If market failure occurs when a firm’s knowledge is traded, advantages accrue to the 
firm which internalizes the transfer of this knowledge (Buckley and Casson 1976, Hennart 1982), the reason 
for this being a conflict of interest among the transacting parties. Due to the scarcity and value of knowledge 
and technology assets, the MNE may be the subject of opportunism in dealings with external parties which 
seek to expropriate its knowledge. In such cases, internalization theory suggests that the MNE will 
internalize the utilization, exploitation and transfer of knowledge rather than risk expropriation through the 
market mechanism (Eden et al, 1996). In transition economies, the potential risk of opportunism and 
conflicts between external parties are large. If its knowledge is a highly firm specific asset, the MNE will 
establish a fully owned subsidiary, thus creating a high degree of knowledge protection. If, by contrast, 
knowledge is less firm specific, a joint venture may be established, with the calculated risk of dissipation and 
potential opportunity costs.  
The technological competence perspective rests on knowledge competence which is unique to each firm.  
The exploitation of such knowledge is firm-specific, often tacit, difficult to provide the receivers with, and 
incomprehensible to competitors. This knowledge resides in the norms and routines shared by the employees 
of the firm (Nelson and Winter, 1982) and requires direct interaction between the employees possessing the 
knowledge and the recipient. In their seminal paper, Kogut and Zander (1993) view MNEs as social 
communities which create and internally disseminate knowledge. The issue of transfer costs is less important 
than in the case of the public good perspective. In addition, they show that such attributes of technology as 
tacitness, codifiability and teachability determine how technology is transferred; for example, through 
licensing, to a wholly owned subsidiary, or to a joint venture. As a result, the difficulty of transferring   9
knowledge increases with the growing tacitness and complexity of that knowledge (Cantwell, 1991, Kogut 
and Zander, 1993), that is, control and knowledge complexity are positively associated. This view of the 
knowledge attributes is particularly valid in the case of transition economies.  
In sum, the explanation provided from each of the three theoretical perspectives for the relationship between 
entry mode and the performance of affiliates centres on the characteristics of the knowledge to be 
transferred. This analysis has to be related to the features characteristic of transition economies. Their 
institutional framework does not protect intellectual property rights effectively (Meyer, 2001), which means 
that, from the public good perspective, an increase in the foreign share in the affiliate will decrease the risk 
of firm-specific knowledge being externally appropriated Thus, the question facing the MNE is when to 
transfer firm specific knowledge. From the internalization perspective, the MNE will consider both the kinds 
of knowledge to transfer and the point in time to transfer them with a view to optimising performance. 
Further, the analysis has to take into consideration the technology competence perspective. According to 
Meyer (2000), the transfer of modern managerial skills in Central and Eastern Europe comes prior to 
technology transfer. The successful firms are those which, during the expansion period, strengthened their 
marketing functions, reorganized decision making and information systems, invested in human resources and 
created effective mechanisms of corporate governance (Brada, 2003). Thus, the first step which foreign 
companies have to take involves the training (or retraining) of management, the implementation of new 
knowledge in such fields as marketing, accounting, logistics, etc., and the training of its managerial staff in 
modern leadership (Child and Czegledy, 1996). This knowledge is absolutely critical to the organizational 
change away from the inherited central planning structure in the newly acquired companies (Newman and 
Nollen, 2002); therefore, a large influx of managerial knowledge may be expected, which is in principle tacit 
(Kogut, 1996). This leads to the assumption that tacit knowledge, which is transferred only to affiliates with 
a high level of foreign control, will be transferred during the MNE expansion into the market.  
This takes us to the first hypothesis, which may be worded as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: In transition economies, affiliates with a high level of foreign control tend to achieve 
a high level of profitability in the period of market expansion.   10
For the purposes of further analysing knowledge transfer, it is important to consider knowledge in the form 
embodied in the investment outlays of affiliates. These include investments in new machinery and 
equipment, that is, all costs due to the acquisition of new technology and the implementation of complex 
production machinery and equipment. According to Meyer (2001), the transfer of technology to transition 
countries is of secondary importance to tacit knowledge. This conclusion was confirmed in studies made on 
foreign affiliates in the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, where large investments in technology were 
less important features of the succesful restructuring of recently acquired companies than was knowledge 
(Brada, 2003). Furthermore, case studies analysed by Czegledy (1996) show that newly acquired or 
established companies received mature technology – in the terms of Vernon’s (1966) product cycle theory - 
and achieved better performance than the competitors which had received more advanced technology. The 
arguments above provide a logical argumentation for successful (or the most profitable) foreign investors 
engaging, from the very beginning, in the reorganization of affiliates into well functioning enterprises 
operating coherently with the rest of the MNE network. For this purpose, the MNE transfers primarily tacit 
knowledge (managerial and organizational skills), after which the MNE affiliate in the transition country is 
able to absorb advanced production technology, the output of which may be coherently distributed within the 
MNE network, that is, without managerial or organizational breakdowns.  
Hypothesis 2: In transition economies, affiliates with high investment intensity tend to achieve a 
high level of profitability in the maturity phase, but low profits in the uncertainty 
and market expansion stages.  
2.2. Knowledge absorption 
Zahra and George (2002) argue that firms may transfer knowledge but may not be able to “have the 
capability to transform and exploit the knowledge for profit generation”. Depending on the economic and 
organizational aspects (differences) of the receiving firm, the assimilation and diffusion of knowledge are 
complex processes and not certain of success (Tung, 1994). On this view, Grant’s (1995) suggestion is valid 
that knowledge requires a set of organizational capabilities in order to be productive. In his article, however, 
he does not address the issue of the multinational firm directly, but his results are in line with the arguments   11
found elsewhere that companies (affiliates) have to develop capabilities which allow them to effectively 
transfer and apply new knowledge on a systematic basis (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990, Levitt and March, 
1998). Presented in the Cohen and Levinthal (1990) seminal work, the concept of absorptive capacity gave 
the primary framework required for understanding the conditions applying to the effective transfer of 
knowledge. The assumption made by the authors was that the existence of a knowledge base is a necessary 
condition for the ability of a firm to absorb new knowledge. This issue becomes further complicated with the 
addition of the aspects of a transition economy, where the capabilities of firms often require profound 
improvements differing over time and varying in scope. Turning to the employees in the transition countries, 
we may assume that their technological skills were at a reasonable level while their managerial and social 
skills were deficient due to the comprehensive institutional transition from a central planning regime to a 
market economy (Meyer, 2001). As Swaan (1997) stated, the new skills required in the privatized companies 
were often based on tacit knowledge, which eventually required interactive, time and funds consuming 
learning processes. Labour compensation is of course one of the tools expanding absorptive capacity, which 
ultimately enhances the growth in the financial performance of the affiliate in the form of profitability. The 
issue of absorptive capacity relative to the level of compensation is discussed in the literature on HRM and 
International Economics, which reveals that MNE technology transfer to affiliates requires improvements in 
absorptive capacity, thus enhancing the demand for skilled workers and, consequently, leading affiliates to 
increase wages. The interplay between wage level and absorptive capacity occurs in three situations: (1) 
when it causes improvement in the skills or performance of existing employees; (2) in the case of sourcing of 
highly skilled employees through international transfers (i.e., within the firm in the form of expatriates); or 
(3) in the case of external absorption (from, for instance, other local firms). An example of an HRM study is 
that presented in Minbaeva et al. (2004), which studies MNE affiliates in Russia
2, where the absorptive 
capacity increases when combined with growing rates of different wage incentive systems giving larger 
compensation relative to other employees for skills or performance improvements. In International 
Economics, various studies discuss international transfers of “person-embodied” technology. This tool leads 
                                                 
2 Other countries have been included as well but they were not in the process of transition.   12
to immediate improvement of the absorptive capacity, bringing specialists (expatriates) to the newly 
established or acquired affiliates (Harzing, 1999). This increases the wage level in the affiliate as a result of 
the relatively higher wage level of such new highly skilled personnel. Finally, the third type which leads to 
improvement in the absorptive capacity of the affiliate has first and foremost been investigated in spillover 
studies in International Economics, where, even when the studies control for such characteristics as industry, 
region, and overall size (Aitken et al, 1996), affiliates owned by MNEs have been found to pay higher wages 
than domestically owned companies (Wang et al 2002 (the UK); Yudaeva K., Kozlov K., Melentieva N., 
2000 (Russia); Pawlik, 2005a (Poland)). The reason for this is that, as MNEs transfer and utilize more 
complex firm-specific knowledge, their affiliates raise demand for medium or highly skilled workers. In the 
literature on international business, this absorptive capacity is seen as a promising explanation of business 
performance (Lane, Salk and Lyles 2001). Any improvement in the fundamental capabilities of a firm, 
allowing knowledge transfer and adoption in the receiving unit, will lead to improvement in the performance 
of that firm (Tihanyi and Roath, 2002). Consequently, a high level of wages is related to high absorptive 
capacity, which may lead to a high level of profitability. 
Hypothesis 3: In transition economies, high labour compensation in foreign affiliates is positively 
related to profitability.  
2.3. Control variables 
Growth in the number of foreign affiliates in the industry is related to their strategy and survival and impacts 
on profitability (Table 1). The reason for this is that an increase or decrease in the number of foreign 
competitors in the industry will require strategy adjustments among the other foreign affiliates already active 
in the industry and now facing competitive pressures from “newcomers”. The outcomes of these adjustments 
will result in profitability. This means that, if the number of foreign affiliates does not decrease, this may be 
an indication of successful business operation in terms of coping with increasing competition or strategic, 
long-term investments. Yet another dimension has to be considered in the investigation of the growing 
number of foreign entities and their impact on profitability. Apart from approximating the volume of 
competition, companies also take risk into consideration as this is a main obstacle to market (industry) entry.   13
An increasing number of foreign affiliates is an indication of decreasing entry risk. As a result, new 
companies see positive effects from early entrants and wish to reap the same opportunities with low risk. In 
this case, the growing number of foreign affiliates is an illustration of “snow ball” effect.  
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The number of foreign affiliates in an industry may also be an indication of the number of complementary 
business units. It may, therefore, be a secondary effect of FDI inflow. It is especially the case of Transition 
Economy, where the necessity of building a local value chain and the lack of local producers of 
intermediates might increase the inflow of FDI and the number of new foreign affiliates being established. 
Moreover, this type of complementary value chain collaboration boosts the profitability of the whole 
industry. This situation has been analyzed by Leahy and Pavelin (2003) for FDI strategies aimed at 
maintaining tacit collusion with the other foreign investors. Colluding enterprises either cooperate or follow 
each other, their plants supply their headquarter home markets (often each other’s home markets) and the 
number of equally efficient firms is upheld (Leahy and Pavelin, 2003). 
Hypothesis 4: In transition economies, an increasing number of companies in a given industry will 
have a positive impact on profitability.  
It is well known that, having become foreign affiliates, newly acquired or established foreign affiliates which 
have been integrated in the global network of an MNE enjoy easier access to foreign markets through intra-
firm trade and network economies, which allows them to increase their operational scale and their profits 
(Globerman et al., 1994, p. 154). It has been also shown that firms with greater export orientation have   14
stabler cash flows and are better able to weather downturns and market turbulence than firms with a local 
focus (Campa and Shaver, 2002). This leads to the following formulation: 
Hypothesis 5: In transition economies, highly export oriented foreign affiliates have a high level of 
profitability. 
The literature offers few theories to explain how firm size impacts on profitability. Bain’s (1951) hypothesis 
that economies of scale are important determinants of economic returns, indicates a positive relation between 
firm size and profitability. Some decades later, Demsetz (1973) argued that firms which enjoy cost and 
efficiency advantages will eventually outgrow their competitors, resulting in a positive relation between firm 
size and profitability. Finally, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) assumed that, having greater organizational 
complexity, large firms tend to have a high level of performance.  
Hypothesis 6:  In transition economies, large foreign affiliates will achieve high levels of 
profitability.  
2.4. Alternative exploratory model 
As was discussed above, growth in the number of affiliates is an indication of the survival rate in the given 
industry. From a theoretical point of view, an increase in the number of companies, as well as the 
profitability of the industry as a whole, is an indication of the performance of foreign entities in the industry 
because, over time, foreign companies in industries in which the number of foreign affiliates is increasing 
have to survive tight competition. As a result, an increase over a long time period in the number of foreign 
companies is a sign of successful business operation. Based on the above hypothesis on the relation to 
performance, the model, which assumes the number of foreign affiliates to be a dependent variable, may be 
formulated along the same lines as the hypothesis on profitability above.   15
3. Data and research methodology 
 
As was stressed above, the unit of analysis is not firms but industries, specifically 3-digit NACE industry 
sectors, which typically consist of groups of firms. 
3.1. Data 
The database was created in cooperation with the Central Statistical Office of Poland. The database is unique 
and includes information on all foreign companies in which the number of employees exceeds nine and 
which have a foreign capital share equal to or greater than ten percent of total equity. The database 
includes export and import data, sales value, wages, number of companies and employees, 
investment outlays and foreign capital share. Further details are given in appendix A, which also 
includes the partial correlation between all variables, shown as scatter plots. 
The 3-digit NACE classification is obviously not a perfect industry description because it conceals 
differences between a number of sub-segments within some industries, giving averages of all measures for a 
given industry. The variables are fairly standard industry characteristics from the industrial economics 
literature and have also been used in empirical studies of ownership structure in the field of International 
Business (IB).  
3.2. Performance Measures 
It is important to note that it is unclear whether flow-based measurements, especially profits, are less reliable 
in a transition context (Bevan et al, 1999) than in a developed market economy. In many transition 
economies, levels of effective taxation are below official nominal rates. Some of the companies may 
underreport certain indicators, which may, for example, increase the tax liability of the enterprise. These 
facts are likely to introduce a certain bias to flow data such as profits (Bevan et al, 1999). A few studies, 
however – one of them being Chandler and Hanks (1993) – show that it is purposeful to construct 
performance variables, using subjective measures (for example, questionnaires to managers) but, due to lack 
of data, the present study includes no constructions of this type.   16
Different types of profitability measures have been used as measures of affiliate performance in the field of 
International Organization. Scherer and Ross (1990) used two main definitions of profitability:  
Return on equity 
equity rs shareholde of value Book
profit Accounting





ROE = 2 , 1        (1) 
Return on sales 
Sales
profit Accounting





ROS = 2 , 1        (2) 
This paper measures affiliate performance along two dimensions: (1) before-tax return on equity (ROE1) and 
after-tax Return on Equity (ROE2); and (2) before-tax Return on Sales (ROS1) and after-tax Return on Sales 
(ROS2). In order to reduce potential distortions in the denominator base, return on sales is preferred over 
return on assets and equity (Geringer et al., 1989) because sales are generally expressed in current monetary 
terms since they constitute part of the annual operations of a particular company. In contrast, assets and 
equity may present biases because of intercompany differences in depreciation methods, local tax 
regulations, domestic inflation and exchange rate fluctuation (Geringer et al., 1989). In this study, Return on 
Sales (ROS) is used as the primary measure of profitability and Return on Equity (ROE) as the secondary 
measure.  
The second alternative measure of performance applied in this paper is based on the number of foreign 
affiliates. This measure, however, is not assumed to be the core variable explaining performance; the purpose 
of using this measure is purely exploratory.   
3.3. Explanatory variables 
This study includes six industry-specific explanatory variables (see formula 3), three of them being main 
variables and the other three control variables. The main variables are the following: 
•  Wage level (W/L): this is measured by the share of real salaries, regardless of type of work, in 
relation to the number of employees. Since W/L is an average wage level at industry level, the 
reason for higher W/L levels may lie in higher wages for particular skills or in wages related to 
different skill levels.    17
•  Investment intensity: this is measured by the investments-to-sales ratio (I/S), that is, all expenditures 
on fixed assets (tangible and non-tangible
3) as a share of sales.  
•  Foreign Control: this is measured by the foreign capital share (FCS), that is, the foreign booked 
equity share as a part of total equity provided for setting up the business entity at the moment of 
establishing the company. 
The control variables are the following: 
•  Number of foreign companies (NC): this is the number of foreign affiliates in a given industry.  
•  Export Intensity (X/S): this is measured by exports-to-sales ratio, where value of exports is sourced 
from the annual balance sheet.  
•  Scale economies (SCALE): this is measured by the average size of the entity using sales divided by 
the number of companies.  
3.4. Regression Model 
The main purpose of this paper is to explain the degree of performance of foreign affiliates in Poland 
(dependent variable) by means of six independent variables as explained in the six hypotheses in section 2. 
The model applied is the following: 
PROFi,t  =  β0 + β1(NC)it +  β2(W/L)it +  β3(X/S)it +  β4(I/S)it +  β5FCSit +  β6SCALEit   + εi,t 
1993-95 +  +  +  -  -/+ +   
1996-99 +  +  +  -  + +   
2000-02 +  +  +  +  -/+ +   
where subscripts i and t denote industry and time, respectively, and the signs below the coefficients indicate 
the partial association assumed between PROF and a given independent variable.  
As regards sub periods, the model is expected to yield the following results
4 indicated. As indicated in the 
hypotheses, changes in the signs are expected to take place only where two variables are concerned: 
investment intensity and foreign capital share. The negative relation between investment intensity and 
                                                 
3 Non-tangible assets include software, consulting services, etc. 
4 The shadowed highlights show the changes of signs across the three periods. The signs without shadowed highlights 
are the ones where the signs remain similar to the model covering the whole period observed (that is, without sub-
periods)   18
profitability is assumed to hold in uncertainty and expansion periods, while a positive relation is expected in 
maturity. As concerns foreign capital share, a positive result is expected in the expansion period, while the 
two other sub-periods may bring mixed results. The alternative exploratory model does not consider sub 
periods but tests all variables across the ten-year period. The model, which was hypothesized in section 2.4 
above, is the following: 
NCit   =  β0 + β1(W/L)it +  β2(X/S)it +  β4(I/S)it +  β5FCSit +  β6SCALEit   + εi,t 
  + +  -  +  +   
 
3.5. Techniques of estimation 
The data set has both a cross-sectional dimension (covering approximately 140 industries) and a time series 
one (spanning ten years). In order to increase the sample size, a pooled cross-section analysis over ten years 
was carried out. Panel data analysis was also done to account for possible heterogeneity across 
manufacturing industries. This estimation technique assumes that the intercept (β0) in equation (3) varies 
across industries and thus may be written as β 0i. β 0i  captures all unobserved, time-constant factors which 
affect profitability (ROEi,t, ROSi,t). The estimates made in this paper apply a fixed and random effect model. 
In the former, β 0i is expected to be a fixed parameter and allows for arbitrary correlations between β 0i and 
the independent variables in any time period; in the latter, unobserved effects are expected to be uncorrelated 
with all explanatory variables (Woolridge, 2003).  
The analysis starts from pooled regression and continues with fixed and random panel estimations. In panel 
estimations, the F-test (fixed effect) and the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test (random effect) 
show unobserved heterogeneity. If unobserved heterogeneity is observed in both, the Hausman test compares 
both panel estimations and detects which one is the more valid. The analysis uses a semi-log model because 
profitability may include positive as well as negative values.   
According to the definition presented in the appendix, the value of foreign capital share starts from 0.1 and 
has a maximum of 1.00. As may be seen from figure 2, the distribution across all 1,405 observations is 
skewed to the right with roughly 90% of the observations above 50%.    19
Even though this situation would suggest full control over a company in the given industry, firm level 
evidence may be different. Foreign capital share may, however, take different values and, from this 
perspective, it may be argued that the interesting variable is not a continuous FCS-variable like the one used 
above but a dichotomous FCS-variable taking the value of, for example, 0 for foreign capital shares below 
0.5 or else the value of 1. As the data in this study involves industry averages, however, a foreign capital 
share of 0.6 for a given industry in a given year may, for example, consist of the following FCS’s at firm 
level: 0.3, 0.3, 0.9, 0.9 that is two foreign companies with “full” control and two with “less than full control”. 




Source: Own calculation 
As mentioned above, another problem with the FCS variable is that, as described in hypothesis 6, the 
theoretical relation may in some cases be contradictory to the actual privatization process followed in 
Poland. In sum, the continuous variable approach applied in this study makes sense. 
4. Empirical results 
The correlation between variables presented in table 2 and in figure A1 in the appendix appears to be very 
low, implying low multicollinearity of the proposed model. NC (number of companies) shows the highest   20
level of correlation with profits. In the case of ROS, the relation is positive while the association with ROE 
appears to be negative. 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix 1993-2002.  
Variables  ROS GROSS  ROS NET  ROE GROSS  ROE NET  NC  W/L  X/S  I/S  FCS  SCALE 
ROS GROSS  1                            
ROS NET  0.991  1                         
ROE GROSS  0.213  0.1888  1                     
ROE NET  0.26  0.2404  0.983 1                  
NC  0.133  0.1362  -0.116 -0.113 1               
W/L  0.005  0.0141  0.025 0.029 0.0314 1            
X/S  0.017  0.0222  0.025 0.033 -0.081 -0.029 1          
I/S  -0.023  -0.047  -0.024 -0.024 -0.044 0.007 -0.092  1       
FCS -0.03  -0.023  -0.004 -0.011 0.16 0.061 -0.037  0.0049  1    
SCALE 0.019  0.0161  -7E-04 -0.001 0.0508 0.206 -0.057  -0.0071  0.0173 1
Source: Own Calculation.  
Figure 4 illustrates the cumulative relative frequency of foreign control over three stages of foreign affiliate 
behaviour. A clear trend may be observed, involving growing foreign control over the affiliates and, in the 
last subperiod (2000-2002), showing the largest group of foreign affiliates to be almost wholly owned by 
foreign investors, i.e., in more than 50% of all of the affiliates, foreign owners hold a share of more than 
90%.  













































Source: Own Calculation.  
In tables 3 and 4 and in section B in the appendix, the results of pooled (OLS) and panel estimations 
including necessary tests have been presented. The pooled (OLS) regressions are rejected in favour of the   21
fixed effect and random effect regressions, which provide evidence for unobserved heterogeneity. In almost 
all the cases, random effect were favoured by Hausman specification tests, which means that some regressors 
are uncorrelated with the unobserved heterogeneity term. Only in the model for 1996-1999 with ROE (net 
and gross) as a dependent variable, does the Hausman specification test favour fixed effect regression, 
implying that, in this specific case, regressors are correlated with the unobserved effect. Consequently, the 
fixed effect estimation for ROE in 1996-1999 removes the unobserved effect along with any time constant 
explanatory variables. The foreign control (FCS) variable is highly significant in relation to ROS, but the 
sign changes over the periods. A high degree of foreign ownership is associated with high profits in the 
expansion period while foreign control is negatively related to profits in the uncertainty and maturity phases. 
Investment intensity (I/S) shows a positive high association with a high level of profits in the maturity phase. 
Table 3. Results of panel estimations across different time spans - (net) profitability relative to industry 
determinants. 
Dependent variable  Net Return on Sales   Net Return on Equity  
estimation type  Random  Random  Fixed  Random 
years  1993-1995  1996-1999  2000-2002  1993-1995  1996-1999  2000-2002 
Variables  β t-test  β t-test β t-test  β t-test  β t-test  β t-test 
(Constant) -0.10* (-2.19)  0.00 (1.64) -0.10* (-2.49) -0.07 (-0.08) 3.61**  (2.71) 0.52 (0.67)
ln (NC)  0.01 (1.62)  0.02** (2.99) 0.02** (3.26) -0.01 (-0.04) -1.27**  (-3.46) -0.19 (-1.43)
ln (W/L)  0.02* (1.98) -0.01 (-0.56) 0.00 (-0.28) 0.23 (1.13) -0.26  (-1.28)  -0.06 (-0.66)
ln (X/S)  0.01 (-0.37)  0.01* (2.05) 0.01 (-1.49) 0.00 (0.07) 0.06 (1.17)  -0.04 (-0.59)
ln (I/S)  -0.01 (-1.15)  -0.02** (-3.32) 0.01 (1.67) -0.10 (-0.97) -0.05 (-0.48)  0.06 (0.77)
ln (FCS)  -0.02* (-2.13)  0.07* (2.52) -0.06** (-2.88) -0.23 (-0.53) 0.86*  (1.98) 0.15 (0.34)
ln (SCALE)  0.00 (-0.54)  0.00 (0.37) 0.01 (1.31) -0.04 (-0.52) 0.12  (1.62)  0.05 (0.87)
R Sq within  0.05 0.08  0.08  0.03  0.03 0.03 
N 365  557  483  365  557  483 
F  3.06*** 2.27***  2.52***  9.28***  2.82*** 4.87*** 
Hausmam test  11.48  4.89  10.84  5.68  21.23***  9.63 
Lagrarian Multiplier test  26.41***  26.45*** 26.38*** 57.02***      4.22* 
Notes: The independent variables are: NC: number of companies. W/L: wage level. X/S: export intensity. I/S: 
investment activity. FCS: foreign control, SCALE: scale economies. N: number of observations. *, **, *** 
significant at 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels.  
Labour Compensation (W/L) is positively related to ROS in the uncertainty stage; there is no evidence of 
any association with profits in any other sub-periods. On this basis, the conclusion is that hypotheses 1 and 
2 are confirmed and that hypothesis 3 is not rejected.   22
Table 4. Results of panel estimations across different time spans - (gross) profitability  relative to industry 
determinants. 
Dependent variable  Gross Return on Sales   Gross Return on Equity  
estimation type  Random  Random  Fixed  Random 
years  1993-1995  1996-1999  2000-2002  1993-1995  1996-1999  2000-2002 
Variables  β t-test  β t-test β t-test  β t-test  β t-test  β t-test 
(Constant)  -0.08 (-1.66) -0.08 (-1.31) -0.09* (-2.01) 0.07 (0.07) 5.68**  (3.15) 1.06 (1.07)
Ln (NC)  0.01 (1.59)  0.02** (2.83) 0.02** (3.10) -0.03 (-0.11) -1.94***  (-3.89) -0.39 (-1.08)
ln (W/L)  0.02* (1.98) -0.01 (-0.54) 0.00 (-0.70) 0.29 (1.25) -0.43 (-1.54) -0.13 (-1.12)
ln (X/S)  0.00 (-0.20)  0.01* (1.98) 0.00 (-1.65) 0.01 (0.17) 0.08 (1.12)  -0.07 (-0.89)
ln (I/S)  0.00 (-0.85)  -0.02** (-2.75) 0.01 (1.67) -0.13 (-1.15) -0.08  (-0.56) 0.06 (0.55)
ln (FCS)  -0.01* (-2.10)  0.07* (2.25) -0.07** (-2.91) -0.24 (-0.49) 0.72*  (2.05) -0.23 (-0.39)
ln (SCALE)  0.00 (-0.52) 0.00 (0.36) 0.01 (1.59) -0.05 (-0.59) 0.18 (1.70)  0.08 (1.07)
R Sq within  0.05 0.08  0.08  0.03 0.03 0.03 
N  365 557  483 365  557  483 
F  3.02*** 2.53***  2.57***  9.19*** 3.11***  6.31*** 
Hausmam test  11.48 4.89  10.84 5.30 25.58***  9.34 
Lagrarian Multiplier test   26.41*** 26.45***  26.38***  57.98***  102.65***    7.32** 
Notes: The independent variables are: NC: number of companies. W/L: wage level. X/S: export intensity. I/S: 
investment activity. FCS: foreign control, SCALE: scale economies. N: number of observations. *, **, *** 
significant at 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels.  
The results for control variables are poor. In all the econometric models, the number of foreign companies 
(NC) (pooled, fixed and random) shows high significance with the positive sign, as expected, for return on 
sales (ROS) in the expansion and maturity periods. In the models with return on equity (ROE), the same 
control variable performs badly across all estimations with low (or no) significance and with negative signs. 
In the expansion stage, Export intensity (X/S) is significant and positively related to ROS.  
In order to improve and broaden the research perspective, the model was tested with control dummies for the 
manufacturing sector and for time (for individual years and time trend). Unexpectedly, the results have not 
brought any changes or new insights. The model was also tested for the whole ten year period without any 
sub-period assumption (table B1-B3 in the appendices). The results show that the number of companies in 
the industry contributes positively to the increase in ROS while investments and foreign control are 
negatively associated with the dependent variable. The similar results for ROE are mainly insignificant.  
Table 5 provides the results based on the alternative exploratory model, where the dependent variable is the 
number of companies. The estimations favoured the random effect model.    23
Table 5. Association between number of foreign companies and industry determinants. 
Types of econometric estimation   Pooled Fixed  Random 
Dependent Variable 
 
LN (NC)  LN (NC)  LN (NC) 
Explanatory 
Variables  β t-test  β t-test β t-test 
(Constant)  0.08 (1.55) 2.89*** (38.27)  2.59*** (23.07)
ln (W/L)  0.01 (0.76) 0.08*** (4.55)  0.08***  (4.46)
ln (X/S)  0.12*** (4.54) 0.00 (0.53)  0.00  (0.61)
ln (I/S)  0.74*** (6.92) 0.04** (3.42)  0.04***  (3.68)
ln (FCS)  0.00 (0.12) 0.43*** (9.38)  0.44***  (9.59)
ln (SCALE)  3.13*** (13.90) 0.00 (-0.50)  0.00  (-0.38)
R Sq  
   Overall   0.05 0.05  0.05 
   Within    0.10 0.10 
F test  14.45*** 77.28***   
N  1405 1405  1405 
Hausman test    4.12 4.12 
Lagrarian Multiplier test  3596.01***    3596.01*** 
Notes:  The independent variables are: NC: number of companies. W/L: wage level. X/S: 
export intensity. I/S: investment activity. FCS: foreign control, SCALE: scale 
economies. N: number of observations. *, **, *** significant at 5%, 1%, and 0.1% 
levels.  
The results illustrate the tendency for a high number of foreign affiliates in the given industry to be 
associated with a high level of foreign control, investment intensity and labour compensation.  
5. Conclusions 
On the basis of a unique database on Poland covering the years 1993-2002, this paper analyses the 
determinants of the performance (return on sales and equity) of foreign affiliates. The statistical analysis was 
divided into three short time spans based on industry external (GDP) and internal (number of foreign 
affiliates) factors: (1) 1993-1995 “uncertainty” (growth in the number of foreign affiliates and increasing 
GDP); (2) 1996-1999 “expansion” (growth in the number of foreign affiliates and stable GDP); and (3) 
2000-2002 “maturity” (growth in the number of foreign affiliates and decreasing GDP). The results show the 
association between foreign ownership and profitability to change over time: in the expansion stage, the 
association is positive; in the stages of uncertainty and maturity, it is negative. Given the argument that high 
foreign control implies transfer of tacit knowledge, the results clearly show that only in the expansion stage 
is a high level of control (tacit knowledge) associated with a high level of profits. Labour compensation, an 
indicator for improved absorptive capacity, tends to be positively associated with profitability in the   24
uncertainty stage. This result confirms the argumentation in the management literature that improving 
absorptive capacity prior to transferring any knowledge – whether tacit or explicit (production technology) – 
is of importance. Investment activity, an indicator for technology transfer, suggests that there is no evidence 
of any investment effects on profits in the stages of uncertainty and expansion. In the maturity phase, 
however, a high level of investment activity is associated with a high level of profitability, indicating that 
new and highly modernized equipment “pulls up” profits. The results of the stepwise approach presented in 
this paper have clear managerial implications for foreign affiliates entering a transition economy. Successful 
foreign affiliates are those which: 
-   in the first phase, improve the absorptive capacity of the company through labour compensation, 
-  in the second phase, transfer distinct tacit knowledge, using foreign control 
-  in the third phase, transfer production technology embodied in production equipment, thus 
increasing investment outlays relative to sales. 
The results for increasing numbers of foreign affiliates as a performance measure are also interesting and 
precursory. A high level of competition among foreign affiliates leads to a high level of improvements in 
absorptive capacity and of inflowing tacit knowledge, but, as the level of investment intensity is still low, the 
implication is that a high level of competition (survival in the industry) is not an effect of a high level of 
investments in production machinery and equipment.  
The paper also has clear policy implications. As the number of foreign company entries and the level of 
profitability in a transition economy are strongly correlated with the growth of GDP, this implies that 
governmental attempts at attracting foreign companies do not explain the increase in the number of entries 
and company profitability. Rather, these are stimulated by stable and sustainable high GDP growth levels.    25
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Appendix A 
Data description 
The Central Statistical Office (GUS), the National Bank of Poland and the Polish Agency for Foreign 
Investments are the main providers of data on foreign companies in Poland. The methodologies employed by 
these institutions reveal many differences, which, to a large extent, are the result of different objectives, 
sources and legal frameworks. As described in Pawlik (2004), data collected in accordance with the legal 
foundation of GUS is informative, reflective and reliable in relation to research on foreign companies 
operating in Poland. This paper, therefore, is based on a database created in cooperation with GUS. 
In our dataset, foreign companies are all companies established in accordance with Polish commercial law, 
having a number of employees exceeding nine persons and a foreign capital share equal to or greater than ten 
percent of total equity (basic capital)
5. The minimum foreign capital share comes from the OECD definition, 
which says that a foreign investor holds at least ten per cent of the ordinary shares or voting rights in the firm 
in which the investment takes place.
6  
Table 1. Number of potential observations for different datasets and analytical purposes 
Number of cases at the NACE 3-digit:  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Total Economy  222 
Observations available for Total Economy  111 122 133 141 146 131 139 143 172 169
Observations available for unbalanced panel 
estimations   1405 
Observations available for unbalanced panel 
estimations 365  557  483 
 
The data for this paper was sourced from balance sheets (BS) delivering figures on: foreign capital share in 
total equity, sales, profits, loss, investments outlays, remunerations (wages), number of employees and 
companies. According to the regulations on public statistics in Poland, figures cannot be disseminated if 
there are less than three units in the aggregation (sales, exports etc.). Consequently, results may be biased in 
the sense that information on large foreign companies to is more hidden than information on small ones. 
Due to the limitations of the data on foreign companies mentioned above, only the dataset with the 3-digit 
NACE level (groups) was acquired as this is the most detailed one. In the all Economy sphere, there are 222 
groups in the NACE classification, which are potential objects of observation. Over the years, the number of 
observations available for different estimations differs, see table 1. 
                                                 
5 GUS specifies that foreign capital is the basic capital (equity) provided by foreign investors, which are: (1) private persons whose place of living is 
located abroad, (2) legal entities with foreign headquarters, (3) legal entities of a company which is a private or legal person established abroad 
according to the legal framework of the foreign country, (4) legal entities whose headquarters is located in the Republic of Poland and dependent on 
another foreign entity. 
6 For a definition, visit http://www.oecd.org    30
Figure A1. Scatter plots of the variables. 
 
 
  Source: Own calculation   31 
Appendix B 
 
Table B1.Results of pooled regressions for profitability and its industry determinants, Poland 1993-2002 
 
Dependent variable Return on Sales Gross   Return on Sales Net  Return on Equity Gross  Return on Equity Net 
Variables  β t-test β t-test  β t-test  β t-test 
(Constant)  -0.04 (-1.23) -0.06* (-2.12) 3.53* (2.33) 2.24* (2.36)
ln (NC)  0.02*** (5.02) 0.02*** (5.21) -0.64*** (-3.82) -0.38*** (-3.63)
ln (W/L)  0.00 (0.19) 0.00 (0.48) 0.52 (1.53) 0.36 (1.68)
ln (X/S)  0.01** (2.70) 0.01** (2.99) 0.02 (0.20) 0.02 (0.31)
ln (I/S)  0.00 (-0.96) -0.01 (-1.91) -0.21 (-1.25) -0.12 (-1.10)
ln (FCS)  -0.01 (-1.00) -0.01 (-0.82) 0.46 (0.66) 0.19 (0.43)
ln (SCALE)  0.00 (-0.06) 0.00 (-0.18) -0.28 (-1.77) -0.20* (-1.98)
Adj R Sq  0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 
N  1405 1405 1405 1405 
F  5.83*** 6.76*** 3.51*** 3.71*** 
VIF average  1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10 
Notes: The independent variables are: NC: number of companies. W/L: wage level. X/S: export intensity. I/S: 
investment activity. FCS: foreign control, SCALE: scale economies. N: number of observations. VIF: variance 
inflation factor. Robust standard errors used.*, **, *** significant at 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels.    32 
Table B2.Results of fixed panel estimation for profitability and its industry determinants, 
Poland 1993-2002 
 
Dependent variable Return on Sales Gross   Return on Sales Net  Return on Equity Gross  Return on Equity Net 
Variables  β t-test β t-test  β t-test  β t-test 
(Constant)  -0.13** (-3.23) -0.14*** (-3.70) 1.05 (1.34) 0.59 (0.91)
ln (NC)  0.04** (3.39) 0.03** (3.18) -0.34 (-1.70) -0.21 (-1.29)
ln (W/L)  0.00 (-0.24) 0.00 (0.12) -0.16 (-1.36) -0.10 (-1.02)
ln (X/S)  0.00 (0.75) 0.00 (0.97) 0.03 (0.65) 0.02 (0.50)
ln (I/S)  -0.01 (-1.73) -0.01* (-2.58) -0.01 (-0.15) 0.00 (0.00)
ln (FCS)  -0.06** (-3.24) -0.05** (-2.98) -0.41 (-1.22) -0.27 (-0.99)
ln (SCALE)  0.00 (0.75) 0.00 (0.58) 0.08 (1.43) 0.05 (1.11)
R Sq:     
   Overall   0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
   Between  0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 
    Within  0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 
N  1405 1405 1405 1405 
F  3.67*** 3.34*** 5.01*** 4.10*** 
Notes:  The independent variables are: NC: number of companies. W/L: wage level. X/S: export intensity. I/S: 
investment activity. FCS: foreign control, SCALE: scale economies. N: number of observations. *, **, *** 
significant at 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels.    33 
Table B3.Results of random panel estimation for profitability and its industry determinants, Poland 1993-2002 
 
Dependent variable Return on Sales Gross   Return on Sales Net  Return on Equity Gross  Return on Equity Net 
Variables  β t-test β t-test  β t-test  β t-test 
(Constant)  -0.09** (-2.71) -0.11*** (-3.53) 1.02 (1.53) 0.49 (0.93)
ln (NC)  0.02*** (4.02) 0.02*** (4.08) -0.32* (-2.32) -0.17 (-1.65)
ln (W/L)  0.00 (0.06) 0.00 (0.41) -0.14 (-1.17) -0.08 (-0.85)
ln (X/S)  0.00 (1.23) 0.00 (1.51) 0.02 (0.55) 0.01 (0.42)
ln (I/S)  -0.01 (-1.69) -0.01** (-2.63) -0.04 (-0.58) -0.02 (-0.43)
ln (FCS)  -0.04** (-2.69) -0.04* (-2.47) -0.35 (-1.13) -0.24 (-0.95)
ln (SCALE)  0.00 (0.44) 0.00 (0.28) 0.06 (1.13) 0.04 (0.80)
R Sq:     
   Overall   0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 
   Between  0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 
    Within  0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 
N  1405 1405 1405 1405 
F  3.67*** 3.34*** 5.01*** 4.10*** 
Hausmam test  8.49 7.33 8.10 6.16 
Lagrarian Multiplier test  160.04*** 117.82*** 144.99*** 122.21*** 
Notes:  The independent variables are: NC: number of companies. W/L: wage level. X/S: export intensity. I/S: 
investment activity. FCS: foreign control, SCALE: scale economies. N: number of observations. *, **, *** 
significant at 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels.    34 
Table B4.Results of pooled regressions for profitability and its industry determinants, Poland 1993-2002 
 
Dependent 
Variables  Return on Sales Net  Return on Equity Net  Return on Sales Gross  Return on Equity Gross 
Years 1993-1995  1996-1999  2000-2002  1993-1995  1996-1999  2000-2002  1993-1995  1996-1999  2000-2002  EG 1993-1995  EG 1996-1999  EG 2000-2002 
Explanatory 
Variables  β t-test  β t-test  β t-test  β t-test  β t-test  β t-test  β t-test  β t-test β t-test  β t-test  β t-test  β t-test 
(Constant)  -0.07 (-1.47) -0.07 (-1.23)  -0.08 (-1.82) 0.98 (0.90) -0.88 (-1.25) 0.83 (1.01 -0.04 (-0.83)  -0.04 (-0.68) -0.07 (-1.47) 1.06 (0.87) -1.20 (-1.25) 1.45 (1.32) 
ln (NC)  0.01 (1.64) 0.02***  (3.43)  0.02*** (3.94) -0.16 (-1.04) -0.01 (-0.17) -0.10 (-1.31) 0.01 -1.37  0.02** (3.27) 0.02*** (3.77) -0.2 (-1.16) -0.06 (-0.03) -0.22*  (-2.09) 
ln (W/L)  0.03* (2.17) -0.01 (-0.64)  -0.02 (-0.58) 0.24 (0.68) -0.10 (-0.46) 0.07 (0.56) 0.03*  (1.99) -0.01 (-0.58) -0.01 (-0.95) 0.32 (0.81) -0.11 (-0.02) 0.06  (0.32) 
ln (X/S)  0.01 (1.39) 0.01*  (2.43) 0.02 (1.00) 0.04 (0.42) 0.02 (0.44) 0.13 (1.45) 0.01  (0.01) 0.01* (2.19) 0.02 (1.22) -0.03 (-0.35) 0.02 (0.44) 0.02 (0.31) 
ln (I/S)  -0.02 (-0.74) -0.03***  (-4.37) 0.01 (1.23) -0.05 (-0.39) -0.33*** (-4.35) 0.02 (0.59) -0.02 (-0.68)  -0.02*** (-3.89) 0.01 (1.65) -0.11 (-0.73) -0.52*** (-0.20) 0.1 (0.85) 
ln (FCS)  -0.05* (-2.21) 0.07**  (3.08)  -0.04* (-2.06) -1.00* (-1.98) 0.13 (0.42) 0.07 (0.21) -0.04*  (-1.97)  0.07** (2.72) -0.05* (-2.23) -1.04* (-1.98) -0.08 (-0.01) -0.07 (-0.15) 
ln (SCALE)  -0.01 (-0.96) 0.07 (0.06)  0.01 (1.12) -0.12 (-0.94) 0.07 (0.99) -0.01 (-0.18) -0.01  (-1.10)  0.07 (0.16) 0.01 (1.41) -0.15 (-1.04) 0.11 (0.05) -0.03 (-0.30) 
Adj R Sq  0.04  0.08  0.04  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.06  0.04  0.01  0.04  0.01 
N  365 557  483 365  557 483  365 557  483 365  557  483 
F 2.601***  9.411***  4.10***  1.21  3.36***  0.66  1.39  6.48***  4.60***  1.23  4.38***  0.49 
VIF  avg 1.22 1.13  1.09 1.22  1.13 1.09  1.22 1.13  1.09 1.22  1.13  1.09 
Notes: The independent variables are: NC: number of companies. W/L: wage level. X/S: export intensity. I/S: investment activity. FCS: foreign control, SCALE: scale 
economies. N: number of observations. VIF: variance inflation factor. Robust standard errors used.*, **, *** significant at 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels.  
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Table B5.Results of fixed panel estimations for profitability and its industry determinants, Poland 1993-2002 
 
Dependent 
Variables  Return on Sales Net  Return on Equity Net  Return on Sales Gross  Return on Equity Gross 
Years 1993-1995  1996-1999  2000-2002  1993-1995 1996-1999  2000-2002  1993-1995  1996-1999 2000-2002  1993-1995   1996-1999 2000-2002 
Explanatory 
Variables  β t-test β t-test  β t-test  β t-test  β t-test  β t-test  β t-test β t-test  β t-test  β t-test  β t-test  β t-test 
(Constant)  -0.13 (-1.60) -0.08 (-0.74)  -0.16 (-1.68) -1.35 (-1.09) 3.61** (2.71) 1.68 (1.13) -0.13 (-1.62) -0.05 (-0.45) -0.15 (-1.39) -1.34 (-0.95) 5.68** (3.15) 2.10 (1.16) 
ln (NC)  0.03 (1.33) 0.03 (0.96)  0.02 (0.63) 0.43 (1.13) -1.27** (-3.46) -0.80 (-1.71) 0.04 (1.65) 0.03 (0.87) 0.02 (0.54) 0.46 (1.07) -1.94*** (-3.89) -0.99 (-1.76) 
ln (W/L)  0.01 (0.86) -0.01 (-0.37)  0.00 (-0.36) 0.21 (0.99) -0.26 (-1.28) -0.15 (-1.52) 0.01 (0.83) -0.01 (-0.39) -0.01 (-0.73) 0.25 (1.07) -0.43 (-1.54) -0.22 (-1.79) 
ln (X/S)  -0.01 (-1.57) 0.01 (1.48)  -0.01 (-1.43) -0.01 (-0.17) 0.06 (1.17) -0.10 (-1.03) -0.01 (-1.60) 0.01 (1.28) -0.01 (-1.50) -0.01 (-0.10) 0.08 (1.12) -0.16 (-1.33) 
ln (I/S)  -0.01 (-0.81) -0.01 (-1.10)  0.00 (1.34) -0.14 (-1.26) -0.05 (-0.48) 0.03 (0.29) -0.01 (-0.70) -0.01 (-0.77) 0.01 (0.76) -0.17 (-1.35) -0.08 (-0.56) 0.04 (0.32) 
ln (FCS)  -0.05 (-1.54) 0.07*  (1.97)  -0.16*** (-4.15) 0.11 (0.21) 0.86* (1.98) 0.09 (0.15) 0.05 (1.62) 0.07 (1.84) -0.18*** (-4.09) 0.11 (0.20) 0.72* (2.05) -0.55 (-0.75) 
ln (SCALE)  0.00 (-0.18) 0.00 (0.21)  0.01 (1.70) -0.03 (-0.40) 0.12 (1.62) 0.11 (1.63) 0.00 (-0.16) 0.00 (0.23) 0.01 (1.91) -0.04 (-0.45) 0.18 (1.70) 0.14 (1.77) 
R Sq:     
   Overall   0.01  0.06 0.03  0.01 0.01 0.01  0.01  0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 
   Between  0.01  0.11 0.03  0.01 0.01 0.01  0.01  0.09 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 
    Within  0.05  0.06 0.08  0.03 0.03 0.03  0.05  0.06 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.03 
N  365  557 483  365 557 483  365  557 483 365 557 483 
F  3.06***  2.27*** 2.52*** 9.28*** 2.82***  4.87***  3.02***  2.53*** 2.57*** 9.19*** 3.11*** 6.31*** 
Notes: The independent variables are: NC: number of companies. W/L: wage level. X/S: export intensity. I/S: investment activity. FCS: foreign control, SCALE: scale 
economies. N: number of observations. *, **, *** significant at 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels.  
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Table B6.Results of random panel estimations for profitability and its industry determinants, Poland 1993-2002 
 
Dependent 
Variables  Return on Sales Net  Return on Equity Net  Return on Sales Gross  Return on Equity Gross 
Years 1993-1995  1996-1999  2000-2002  1993-1995 1996-1999  2000-2002  1993-1995  1996-1999 2000-2002 1993-1995  1996-1999    2000-2002 
Explanatory 
Variables  β t-test  β t-test β t-test  β t-test  β t-test  β t-test  β t-test  β t-test  β t-test  β t-test  β t-test  β t-test 
(Constant)  -0.10* (-2.19) 0.00 (1.64)  -0.10* (-2.49) -0.07 (-0.08) 0.65 (0.67) 0.52 (0.67) -0.08 (-1.66) -0.08 (-1.31) -0.09* (-2.01) 0.07 (0.07) 0.65 (0.67) 1.06 (1.07) 
ln (NC)  0.01 (1.62) 0.02**  (2.99)  0.02** (3.26) -0.01 (-0.04) -0.05 (-0.53) -0.19 (-1.43) 0.01 (1.59)  0.02** (2.83) 0.02** (3.10) -0.03 (-0.11) -0.13 (-0.99) -0.39* (-2.08) 
ln (W/L)  0.02* (1.98) -0.01 (-0.56)  0.00 (-0.28) 0.23 (1.13) -0.20 (-1.03) -0.06 (-0.66) 0.02* (1.98) -0.01 (-0.54) 0.00 (-0.70) 0.29 (1.25) -0.29 (-1.11) -0.13 (-1.12) 
ln (X/S)  0.01 (-0.37) 0.01*  (2.05) 0.01 (-1.49) 0.00 (0.07) 0.04 (0.92) -0.04 (-0.59) 0.00 (-0.20) 0.01* (1.98) 0.00 (-1.65) 0.01 (0.17) 0.04 (0.68) -0.07 (-0.89) 
ln (I/S)  -0.01 (-1.15) -0.02**  (-3.32) 0.01 (1.69) -0.10 (-0.97) -0.24** (-2.98) 0.06 (0.77) 0.00 (-0.85)  -0.02** (-2.75) 0.01 (1.64) -0.13 (-1.15) -0.36** (-3.23) 0.06 (0.55) 
ln (FCS)  -0.02* (-2.13) 0.07*  (2.52)  -0.06** (-2.88) -0.23 (-0.53) 0.33 (0.96) 0.15 (0.34) -0.01* (-2.10)  0.07* (2.25) -0.07** (-2.91) -0.24 (-0.49) 0.15 (0.31) -0.23 (-0.39) 
ln (SCALE)  0.00 (-0.54) 0.00 (0.37)  0.01 (1.31) -0.04 (-0.52) 0.12 (1.67) 0.05 (0.87) 0.00 (-0.52)  0.00 (0.36) 0.01 (1.59) -0.05 (-0.59) 0.17 (1.76) 0.08 (1.07) 
R Sq  
   Overall   0.02  0.08 0.05  0.01  0.03 0.01  0.02  0.06 0.05  0.01 0.04 0.01 
   Between  0.07  0.16 0.06  0.01  0.05 0.01  0.06  0.12 0.06  0.01 0.07 0.01 
   Within  0.05 0.08  0.08 0.03  0.03 0.03  0.05 0.06  0.08  0.03 0.04 0.03 
N  365  557 483  365  557 483  365  557 483  365 557 483 
Hausman 
test  10.46  5.18  11.34  5.68  21.23*** 9.63  11.48  4.89  10.84  5.30 25.58*** 9.34 
Lagrarian 
Mutiplier 
test  32.15*** 15.99***  25.46*** 57.02***  78.07***  4.22* 26.41*** 26.45***  26.38*** 57.98*** 102.65***  7.32** 
Notes: The independent variables are: NC: number of companies. W/L: wage level. X/S: export intensity. I/S: investment activity. FCS: foreign control, SCALE: scale 
economies. N: number of observations. *, **, *** significant at 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels.  
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